Causal reasoning is a fundamental cognitive ability that enables individuals to learn about the complex interactions in the world around them. However, the mechanisms that underpin causal reasoning are not well understood. For example, it remains unresolved whether children's causal inferences are best explained by Bayesian inference or associative learning. The two experiments and computational models reported here were designed to examine whether 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds will retrospectively reevaluate objects—that is, adjust their beliefs about the causal status of some objects presented at an earlier point in time based on the observed causal status of other objects presented at a later point in time—when asked to reason about 3 and 4 objects and under varying degrees of information processing demands. Additionally, the experiments and models were designed to determine whether children's retrospective reevaluations were best explained by associative learning, Bayesian inference, or some combination of both. The results indicated that participants retrospectively reevaluated causal inferences under minimal information‐processing demands (Experiment 1) but failed to do so under greater information processing demands (Experiment 2) and that their performance was better captured by an associative learning mechanism, with less support for descriptions that rely on Bayesian inference. Research Highlights
Five‐ and 6‐year‐old children engage in retrospective reevaluation under minimal information‐processing demands (Experiment 1). Five‐ and 6‐year‐old children do not engage in retrospective reevaluation under more extensive information‐processing demands (Experiment 2). Across both experiments, children's retrospective reevaluations were better explained by a simple associative learning model, with only minimal support for a simple Bayesian model. These data contribute to our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms by which children make causal judgements.

There is a long-standing interest in the role that children's understanding of pretense plays in their more general theory of mind development. Some argue that children understand pretense as a mental state, and the capacity to pretend is indicative of children possessing the capacity for mental representations. Others argue that children understand pretense in terms of actions and appearances, and an understanding of the mental states involved in pretending has a prolonged developmental trajectory. The goal of this paper is to integrate these ideas by positing that children understand pretense as a form of causal inference, which is based on both their general causal reasoning capacities and specific knowledge of mental states. I will first review literature on children's understanding of pretense, and how such understanding can be conceptualized as integrating with children's causal reasoning ability. I will then consider how children's causal knowledge affects the ways they make inferences about others' pretense. Next, I will consider the role of causal knowledge more broadly in children's reasoning about pretense worlds, judgments of possibility, and counterfactual reasoning. Taken together the goal of this review is to synthesize how children understand pretending into a rational constructivist framework for understanding social cognitive development in a more integrative manner.

Research in both laboratory and museum settings suggests that children’s exploration and caregiver–child interaction relate to children’s learning and engagement. Most of this work, however, takes a third-person perspective on children’s exploration of a single activity or exhibit, and does not consider children’s perspectives on their own exploration. In contrast, the current study recruited 6-to 10-year-olds (N = 52) to wear GoPro cameras, which recorded their first-person perspectives as they explored a dinosaur exhibition in a natural history museum. During a 10-min period, children were allowed to interact with 34 different exhibits, their caregivers and families, and museum staff however they wished. Following their exploration, children were asked to reflect on their exploration while watching the video they created and to report on whether they had learned anything. Children were rated as more engaged when they explored collaboratively with their caregivers. Children were more likely to report that they learned something when they were more engaged, and when they spent more time at exhibits that presented information didactically rather than being interactive. These results suggest that static exhibits have an important role to play in fostering learning experiences in museums, potentially because such exhibits allow for more caregiver–child interaction. Copyright © 2023 Weisberg, Dunlap and Sobel.

This project examines how the order of messaging during parent-child interactions at a museum exhibit affects children's engagement with the exhibit. Parents and 4-7-year-olds (N=64) played at a circuit block exhibit. They were first given blocks with descriptive (e.g., This is a battery) or discovery-prompting (e.g., There is no wrong way to play.) messages, and after 90 seconds, given more blocks with the other message type. Children who received discovery-prompting messages second - after being allowed to explore the affordances of the circuit blocks with the descriptive messages - played at the exhibit longer, and participated in more circuit-building challenges on their own. Parents were also sensitive to the order of the messaging; it related to the ways in which they interacted with their children at the exhibit. We conclude by considering how the timing of messages families receive at an exhibit relates to the way they engage with the exhibit.

Microaggressions are subtle, offensive comments that are directed at minority group members and are characteristically ambiguous in meaning. In two studies, we explored how observers interpreted such ambiguous statements by comparing microaggressions to faux pas, offenses caused by the speaker having an incidental false belief. In Experiment 1, we compared third-party observers' blame and intentionality judgments of microaggressions with those for social faux pas. Despite judging neither microaggressions nor social faux pas to be definitively intentional, participants judged microaggressions as more blameworthy. In Experiment 2, microaggressions without explicit mental state information elicited a similar profile of judgments to those accompanied by explicit prejudiced or ignorant beliefs. Although they were, like faux pas, judged not to cause harm intentionally, microaggressive comments appeared to be judged more blameworthy on account of enduring prejudice thought to be lurking behind a speaker's false beliefs. Our current research demonstrates a distinctive profile of moral judgment for microaggressions.

Young children have a nascent capacity to understand how to control variables to uncover causal structure. However, they do not always explore their environment in a way that generates appropriate data for causal learning. Here, we consider a potential reason that children do not explore systematically: whether the nature of their first action influences their subsequent play. Four- to 7-year-olds (N = 105) saw ambiguous data about a novel causal system and were then allowed to explore this system through play. The nature of their first action - specifically whether it varied only one potential cause and whether it was efficacious - affected their subsequent exploration, particularly whether they generated the data necessary to learn the causal structure. But generating these data, independent of their first action, related to whether they disambiguated the data they had initially observed. These results suggest that the extent to which children can learn from their own exploration in play might depend on how that play unfolds.

We examined 6- to 9-year-olds' (N = 60, 35 girls, 34% White, 23% Hispanic, 2% Black/African American, 2% Asian/Asian American, 22% Mixed Ethnicity/Race, 17% Unavailable, collected April–September 2019 in Providence, RI, USA) first-person perspectives on their exploration of museum exhibits. We coded goal setting, goal completion, and behaviors that reflected changes to how goals were accomplished. Whether children played collaboratively related to how often they revised behaviors to accomplish goals (OR = 2.14). When asked to reflect on their play, older children related talk about goals with behavioral revisions, demonstrating that children develop the ability to reflect on their goals when they watch their behaviors change (OR = 1.23). We discuss how these results inform the development of metacognitive reflection on learning through exploration. © 2022 The Authors. Child Development © 2022 Society for Research in Child Development.

We examined 2- and 3-year-old children's ability to use second-order correlation learning-in which a learned correlation between two pairs of features (e.g., A and B, A and C) is generalized to the noncontiguous features (i.e., B and C)-to make causal inferences. Previous findings showed that 20- and 26-month-old children can use second-order correlation learning to learn about static and dynamic features in category and noncategory contexts. The current behavioral study and computational model extend these findings to show that 2- and 3-year-olds can detect the second-order correlation between an object's surface feature and its capacity to activate a novel machine, but only if the children had encoded the first-order correlations on which the second-order correlation was based. These results have implications for children's developing information-processing capacities on their ability to use second-order correlations to infer causal relations in the world. Published by Elsevier Inc.

Across two studies (N = 120), we investigated the development of children's ability to calibrate the certainty of verbal testimony with observable data that varied in the degree of predictive causal accu-racy. In Study 1, 4-and 5-year-olds heard a certain explanation or an uncertain explanation about deterministic causal relations. The 5-year-olds made more accurate causal inferences when the infor-mant provided a certain and more calibrated explanation. In Study 2, children heard similar explanations about probabilistic relations, making the uncertain informant more calibrated. The 5-year-olds were more likely to infer the correct causal relations when the informant was uncertain, but only when the explanation was attuned to the stochasticity of the individual causal events (or out-comes that sometimes occur). These findings imply that the capac-ity to integrate, and make efficient inferences, from distinct sources of knowledge emerges during the preschool years. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.